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SEEING IN COLOR: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AS A
RACE-CONSCIOUS SOLUTION TO PRISON-BASED
GERRYMANDERING
Tatiana S. Laing*
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s political climate, the debate about whether to aspire to
colorblindness or race-consciousness continues to create tension.1 To
some, our country’s progression away from overtly racist policies may
signal the need for a parallel progression away from directly discussing or
addressing racial issues. The Supreme Court is no stranger to this debate.
In its jurisprudence regarding the Fourteenth Amendment and the scope of
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has determined that the Constitution
generally requires states to pursue colorblind policies and state actions.2
Nevertheless, the lived experience of Black and brown people in this
country continues to underscore the need for race-conscious policymaking
and legal analysis.3 Perhaps the only way to remedy the ongoing
discrimination felt by communities of color today is to undertake more
nuanced analyses of complex problems—analyses that the Court’s current
*

J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude,
2016, American University. A special thank you to my faculty advisor, Professor Michael
Coenen, for his guidance and support throughout the writing process. I would also like to
acknowledge those who came before me in the fight for racial justice in this country for
paving the way for the legal arguments contained in this Comment.
1
See generally Race and Discrimination, Opinions About Immigrants and Islam, in
THE PARTISAN DIVIDE ON POLITICAL VALUES GROWS EVEN WIDER: SHARP SHIFTS AMONG
DEMOCRATS ON AID TO NEEDY, RACE, IMMIGRATION, PEW RES CTR. 31 (2017); EDUARDO
BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2003); Ryan Struyk, Blacks and Whites See Racism in the
United States Very, Very Differently, CNN (Aug. 18, 2017, 9:41AM), https://www.cnn.com/
2017/08/16/politics/blacks-white-racism-united-states-polls/index.html.
2
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995) (“[A]ny
individual suffers an injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the government because of
his or her race, whatever that race may be”). See also Eddie Kim, What the Courts Make of
‘Reverse Discrimination’ Complaints, MEL MAG. (June 14, 2018), https://melmagazine.com
/what-the-courts-make-of-reverse-discrimination-complaints-9672e9b9d5c.
3
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010); LEWIS GORDON,
BAD FAITH AND ANTI-BLACK RACISM (1995); Stanley Fish, Reverse Racism, or How the Pot
Got to Call the Kettle Black, ATLANTIC (Nov. 1993), https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/
politics/race/fish.htm.
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constitutional framework largely precludes.4
The mostly unfamiliar problem of prison-based gerrymandering poses
the kind of complex issue that requires nuanced analysis to remedy the
racialized harms that it causes and perpetuates.
Prison-based
gerrymandering occurs when states count people who are incarcerated as
belonging to the population of the voting districts where they are
incarcerated, rather than the districts where they would otherwise reside.5
The practice thus expands the voting power of rural—and hence white—
congressional districts that contain prisons, while correspondingly
diminishing the voting power of prison-less districts in the state.6 Indeed,
the practice most severely dilutes the representation of the majorityminority districts that are home to most of this country’s incarcerated
population.7
Prison-based gerrymandering is fundamentally a byproduct of our
country’s current mass incarceration and segregation practices, and it
exacerbates the vote dilution problem caused by felon disenfranchisement
laws.8 Although the Census Bureau has always counted incarcerated
persons as belonging to the districts of their incarceration, the effects of this
determination with the recent explosion in the U.S. prison population
seriously impact voting districts and voting power.9 As to the problem of
4
See William Y. Chin, The Age of Covert Racism in the Era of the Roberts Court
During the Waning of Affirmative Action, 16 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (“The
majority of society, which the Supreme Court reflects, misperceives racism as merely
hateful individuals engaging in overtly racist acts. . . . But racism extends beyond blatant acts
by individuals. Racism encompasses covert individual behavior, institutional processes, and
systemic dynamics.”); William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America
Today: An Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 9–10 (2012) (“Just as requiring a showing of intent
to cause global warming is pointless for collective action in responding to climate change,
so is it useless for reforming the structural bases of racial inequities. By mandating a
showing of intent, the Court has potentially foreclosed relief for the actions of all but the
most overtly bigoted, those stupid enough to provide evidence of their malevolence.”).
5
See, e.g., Julie A. Ebenstein, The Geography of Mass Incarceration: Prison
Gerrymandering and the Dilution of Prisoners’ Political Representation, 45 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 323, 327–30 (2018).
6
Ebenstein, supra note 5, at 334–35.
7
See Ebenstein, supra note 5, at 335 (“By relocating a concentration of
disenfranchised citizens from primarily urban areas to rural areas where they do not have a
representative accountable to their interests, the combination of felony disenfranchisement
and prison districting severely disrupts representational democracy.”); Peter Wagner,
Breaking the Census: Redistricting in the Era of Mass Incarceration, 38 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1241, 1244–45 (2012).
8
Ebenstein, supra note 5, at 334–35.
9
Wagner, supra note 7, at 1243 (“The 1990 Census was the first to show a sudden
increase in the rate of incarceration, with the rate more than doubling over the previous
decade to 292 people incarcerated per 100,000 residents. By 2000, the number of prisons
had skyrocketed to 1,668, and the prison incarceration rate had risen to 478 per 100,000.
That’s almost one half of one percent of the U.S. population incarcerated in state or federal
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segregation, this country’s struggles have been constant over our entire
history.10 People of color tend to be concentrated in urban areas, while
rural areas tend to be predominately white.11 Prisons tend to be in rural
areas.12 These facts, coupled with the additional fact that our country
disproportionally polices communities of color,13 mean that people of color
end up being systematically assigned to voting districts that have little in
common with their home districts.14 Moreover, since in nearly every state
the incarcerated population does not have the right to vote, its presence
artificially inflates the population of prison districts without
correspondingly changing their political identity.15 This phenomenon is
unsettling not only because of the distortion of voting power but also
because it harkens back to unsavory census procedures from our country’s
early history.16 Fortunately, this important issue has resurfaced in the
news, as both the 2020 census and the 2020 election draw nearer, and
several states have acted to end the practice through new legislation.17 The
prisons.”). States, however, make the ultimate decision for where to count people on their
district maps. See Ebenstein, supra note 5, at 361–66.
10
See Brentin Mock, The Impacts of Segregation on Discrimination in America,
CITYLAB (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/11/the-impacts-of-segregatio
n-on-discrimination-in-america/544970/; Alexander Nazaryan, School Segregation in
America is as Bad Today as It Was in the 1960s, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 22, 2018, 10:46 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/2018/03/30/school-segregation-america-today-bad-1960855256.html; Richard Rothstein, America is Still Segregated. We Need to Be Honest About
Why, GUARDIAN (May 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/1
6/segregation-us-neighborhoods-reasons. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR
OF LAW (2017).
11
See Abdre M. Perry, Recognizing Majority-Black Cities, When Their Existence Is
Being Questioned, BROOKINGS (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2
017/10/04/recognizing-majority-black-cities-when-their-existence-is-being-questioned/.
12
There are other potential reasons that prisons tend to be located in rural areas. See
David Gutierrez, Mass Incarceration in Rural Communities: Out of Sight, Out of Mind,
HARV. POL. REV. (May 27, 2016), http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/48325/
(discussing both the phenomenon of rural prison towns and the economic benefits that
prison towns reap from mass incarceration).
13
See, e.g., Valarie Strauss, Mass Incarceration of African Americans Affects the
Racial Achievement Gap—Report, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpo
st.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/03/15/mass-incarceration-of-african-americans-affectsthe-racial-achievement-gap-report/?utm_term=.30b99e1c158f.
14
Ebenstein, supra note 5, at 369–70.
15
Dale E. Ho, Prison Policy: Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and
the Current Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV 355, 362 (2011).
16
Scholars have compared prison-based gerrymandering with the Three-Fifths
Compromise. See, e.g., John C. Drake, Locked Up and Counted Out: Bringing an End to
Prison-Based Gerrymandering, 37 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 237, 262–63; Ho, supra note 15,
at 362.
17
Mekela Panditharatne, The Way the Census Counts Prison Populations Seriously
Distorts Redistricting, SLATE (July 19, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/07/c
ensus-prison-count-distorts-redistricting-gerrymandering.html; Ludwig Hurtado, States
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problem, however, remains unaddressed nationally and in the majority of
states in this country.18
Although advocates have been aware of this problem and its racial
implications, existing legal challenges to prison-based gerrymandering
have centered on the primarily “colorblind” rules of constitutional
doctrine.19 This Comment argues for a different approach to prison-based
gerrymandering litigation that addresses the racial implications of the
practice directly, by means of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”).
Such a VRA-based approach would eschew the colorblind constraints of
constitutional equal protection analysis and embrace the more explicitly
race-conscious statutory framework of the VRA.
Part II will provide an explanation and contextual background for
prison-based gerrymandering. Part III will explain existing approaches to
remedying prison-based gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause
and discuss the difficulties of this approach. Part IV will introduce and
explore the Voting Rights Act as an additional approach to consider for
prison-based gerrymandering claims. Part V will summarize and conclude.
II. PRISON-BASED GERRYMANDERING EXPLAINED
A. Census Rules and Procedures
The United States Constitution outlines a process for counting and
apportioning people in the country every ten years for representation
purposes.20 Implementing this mandate, Congress established the U.S.
Census Bureau (“Bureau”), which is an agency of the U.S. Federal
Statistical System obligated to plan, implement, and distribute the
decennial census.21
The Census Bureau accounts for people by reference to their “usual
residence,” which is the place where they eat and sleep most of the time.22
This rule allows the Census to uniformly account for populations that are
Move to Outlaw ‘Prison Gerrymandering’: Where Do Inmates Really Live?, NBC NEWS
(May 23, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/will-prison-gerrymanderi
ng-be-next-big-fight-n999656.
18
Hurtado, supra note 17.
19
See infra Part III.
20
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. At the time, the framers did not intend to count every
kind of person the same. Id. (“[A]ccording to their respective Numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
Persons.”).
21
1910 Overview, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through
_the_decades/overview/1910.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2018).
22
Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situation, 83 Fed. Reg. 5525,
5526 (Feb. 8, 2018).
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living away from their permanent address for a significant period.23 The
populations most affected by this policy are college students, members of
the military, and people who are incarcerated.24 States then use total
population numbers from the Census as the basis for their legislative
districting maps.25 While there has been some debate regarding the use of
total population counts—as opposed to counts of eligible voters—for the
purposes of drawing voting districts,26 the Supreme Court has held that
states are entitled to use population counts, which are most accurately
provided by the Census.27 States, though not obligated, have traditionally
used Census data as provided.28 Since the Census numbers are central to
the process of drawing both state legislative and congressional voting
districts, most states count people in the voting district where they are
incarcerated and not where they previously resided.29
Before the 2020 Census, the Census Bureau requested public
comments regarding its residence rules but ultimately decided to keep the
rules in their existing form.30 In the Bureau’s response to public comments,
it noted that “[o]f the 77,887 comments pertaining to prisoners, 77,863
suggested that prisoners should be counted at their home or preincarceration address.”31 The report then summarized the comments as
stating that the current rules lead to the inaccurate representation of
prisoners’ home communities.32 Specifically, the commenters collectively
stated that “prisoners typically come from urban, underserved communities
whose populations are disproportionately African-American and Latino,
while prisons are more likely to be located in largely White (non-Hispanic)
23

Id.
Id. It is worth noting that incarcerated populations are the only ones not voluntarily
located in their voting districts. There are other significant differences between the
incarcerated populations and college students or the military, and they will be addressed in
the discussion of Calvin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292 (N.D. Fla.
2016) and Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016).
25
States create separate maps for congressional districts than they do for state
legislative or local districts. Nevertheless, states use Census data as the basis for each of
these maps. What Is Redistricting, PUB. MAPPING PROJECT, http://www.publicmapping.org/
what-is-redistricting (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
26
Nina Totenberg, When Drawing Districts, Should States Count Each Person or Each
Voter?, NPR (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/12/08/458795687/when-drawingdistricts-should-states-count-each-person-or-each-voter.
27
Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132–33 (2016).
28
Id. at 1142–43.
29
The Problem, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/imp
act.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
30
Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situation, 83 Fed. Reg. at 5526,
5528.
31
Id. at 5527.
32
Id.
24
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rural communities, far from the actual homes of the prisoners.”33 The
comments suggested that the residence rules harmed minority
communities’ representation and even funding prospects.34
At the end of the comment period, the Census Bureau concluded that
“[t]he practice of counting prisoners at the correctional facility is consistent
with the concept of usual residence, as established by the Census Act of
1790.”35 The Bureau, however, noted the distinct responsibilities that
states have when it comes to legislative redistricting.36 The report noted
that states may choose to reallocate their prisoner populations to preincarceration addresses and that the Census would provide data in a way
that can assist that process.37
B. Felon Disenfranchisement (And How Prison-Based
Gerrymandering Exacerbates Its Effects)
Prison-based gerrymandering exacerbates the problems that derive
from felon disenfranchisement.38 If not for the practice of stripping the
right to vote from people who have committed felonies, there would not be
as stark of a vote dilution issue tied to mass incarceration.39
Although the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits states from drawing malapportioned legislative
districts,40 it also provides the basis for withholding the right to vote from
people who have committed crimes.41 Millions of people do not have the
right to vote because of a felony conviction.42 Only two states allow people
33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situation, 83 Fed. Reg. at 5528.
37
Id.
38
Ebenstein, supra note 5, at 334–35.
39
Arguably, even if people who are incarcerated had the right to vote, it would matter
where they were counted for apportionment purposes. But as discussed later in this section,
where felon disenfranchisement does not exist, people who are incarcerated typically vote in
their home districts.
40
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558–59 (1964).
41
US CONST. amend. 14, § 2 (“But when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied
to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion . . . .”). The
Supreme Court has interpreted section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as specifically
authorizing disenfranchisement laws. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974)
(“[T]he exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
42
Jean Chung, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer, SENT’G PROJECT 1 (June 27,
2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Felony-Disenfranchi
sement-Primer.pdf.
34
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with felonies to vote while they are incarcerated, and the remaining states
either withhold the right until parole, the end of probation, or indefinitely.43
Because of these laws and the racialized nature of the criminal justice
system, as of 2016, one in every thirteen Black adults in the United States
was unable to register to vote.44
While felon disenfranchisement on its own disproportionally dilutes
the voting power of Black people across the country,45 prison-based
gerrymandering further exacerbates that core issue by counting these
millions of Americans in voting districts other than their pre-incarceration
districts.46 In the states that do not withhold the right to vote because of a
felony, people who are incarcerated vote by absentee ballot at their preincarceration address.47 It follows that these individuals count as part of
their pre-incarceration district for legislative purposes. In those states,
there is no prison-based gerrymandering issue at all.48 Although it is true
that solving the vote dilution issues that arise from prison-based
gerrymandering will not fully restore the representation of minority
communities, addressing prison-based gerrymandering at least mitigates
the problem by ensuring that majority-minority communities are more
fairly and effectively represented in legislative assemblies.
C. Consequences of Prison-Based Gerrymandering
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(“NAACP”) recently filed a lawsuit, the first of its kind against a state,
alleging that Connecticut’s electoral maps violate the “one person, one

43
Id. Puerto Rico also allows people to vote while incarcerated. Ann Ravel, Puerto
Rico as a Blueprint for Voter Engagement, PAC. STANDARD (July 24, 2017),
https://psmag.com/news/puerto-rico-as-a-blueprint-for-voter-engagement.
44
Chung, supra note 42, at 6.
See also Reginald Jr. Thedford, Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisement and the Fifteenth Amendment: A Constitutional Challenge to PostSentence Disenfranchisement, 6 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUAL. 92, 94 (2018) (“Historically,
confederate states created various schemes to keep black people politically silent. Although
courts have rejected the claim that felon disenfranchisement is a racially discriminatory
practice, African Americans continue to be negatively impacted disproportionately
compared to other races.”).
45
Caren E. Short, “Phantom Constituents”: A Voting Rights Act Challenge to PrisonBased Gerrymandering, 53 HOW. L.J. 899, 909 (2010).
46
Short, supra note 45, at 928–29.
47
Leon Neyfakh, How Do You Vote in Prison and Jail?, SLATE (Nov. 8, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2016/11/most_inmates_in_priso
ns_and_jails_don_t_vote.html.
48
It is also worth noting that these two states are the whitest in the country, isolating
them from the racialized nature of criminal justice in the rest of the country. Nicole Lewis,
In Just Two States, All Prisoners Can Vote. Here’s Why Few Do, MARSHALL PROJECT (June
11, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/06/11/in-just-two-states-all-prisonerscan-vote-here-s-why-few-do.
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vote” promise of the Fourteenth Amendment because of prison-based
gerrymandering.49 Although the complaint highlights the ways in which
prison-based gerrymandering harms Black and Latino communities,50 the
NAACP advances its argument within the “one person, one vote”
framework that governs legislative malapportionment claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.51 Even so, the
complaint manages to illustrate both the general harm that prison-based
gerrymandering imposes on everyone and the particular harms that it
imposes on minority communities.
In Connecticut, there are three times as many white people as Black
and Latino people, while there are twice as many Black and Latino people
in prison as there are white people.52 In addition, despite the concentration
of the prison population in three rural towns,53 a “disproportionate number
of Connecticut prisoners are African American or Latino persons who
maintained a permanent address, pre-incarceration, in one of the State’s
three urban centers of Hartford, Bridgeport, and New Haven and their
immediate suburbs.”54
As a result of these practices, District 59, which includes three
correctional facilities, has 100 true residents for every 85 true residents in
District 97, which includes New Haven.55 Consequently, the vote of a
resident in District 97 “counts for less than 85% of the vote of a District 59
resident.”56 The NAACP argues that because districts like District 97 are
overpopulated relative to districts like District 59, residents of the former
have to work harder than residents of the latter in order to elect their
representatives of choice.57 Furthermore, the representative of District 97
must work harder to represent a surplus of voting constituents compared to
49
Susan
Haigh,
NAACP
Sues
Connecticut
Over
‘Prison
Gerrymandering’, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jun. 28, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/f28f3eeacd
9e443681421a9bede7aaca; Complaint at ¶ 10, NAACP v. Merrill, No. 3:18-cv-01094 (D.
Conn. June 28, 2018) [hereinafter NAACP Complaint].
50
NAACP Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶¶ 11, 36.
51
See NAACP Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶¶ 7–8.
52
NAACP Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 37.
53
NAACP Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶¶ 44–45.
54
NAACP Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 47.
55
NAACP Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 76. For the purposes of this Comment, the
phrase “true resident” refers to residents allocated to the voting district that they live in and
believe to be home. With respect to incarcerated individuals, they are not considered true
residents in a prison-based gerrymandering system that allocates them as residents of the
district where they are incarcerated.
56
Id. Interestingly enough, people who are incarcerated in Connecticut but who have
not been convicted of a felony register and vote “as residents of their pre-incarceration
domiciles.” NAACP Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 70. This calls into question the state’s
rationale for counting incarcerated individuals where they are imprisoned.
57
NAACP Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 77.
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representatives of prison districts.58 Lastly, the state lacks a potential
majority-minority voting district because it counts so many minorities in
distant rural districts.59 The complaint describes this vote dilution in
general terms, but in reality, the harm is specific to communities of color;
without counting those displaced by incarceration, District 97 contains the
city in Connecticut with one of the largest concentrations of Black people
in the state.60
This ongoing case in Connecticut illustrates exactly how prison-based
gerrymandering expands the power of prison-districts while harming
communities of color.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION REMEDIES FOR PRISON-BASED GERRYMANDERING
To date, litigants have only pursued prison-based gerrymandering
claims using the framework based on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.61 This section will explain how courts typically
handle such claims. In addition, this section will analyze the efficacy of
this framework for prison-based gerrymandering claims. Because this
framework has not been successful thus far and because of its lack of direct
remedy for communities of color, litigants should consider an additional
approach.
A. “One Person, One Vote”
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to
require states to create voting districts that provide equal representation
through an equal distribution of population across districts.62 This rule of
“one person, one vote” requires that states allocate representation across
equipopulous voting districts,63 permitting substantial deviations in size
only insofar as the state has a legitimate policy rationale for doing so.64
58

NAACP Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 78.
NAACP Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 93.
60
Chris Kolmar, These Are the 10 Connecticut Cities with the Largest Black
Population for 2018, ROAD SNACKS (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.roadsnacks.net/mostafrican-american-cities-in-connecticut. The only cities with larger numbers of African
Americans are Hartford and Bridgeport, two cities that, according to the NAACP, also
steadily supply the incarcerated population counted in rural Connecticut. Id.; NAACP
Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 47.
61
My research did not reveal any cases with a different approach.
62
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558–59 (1964).
63
See, e.g., Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758, 760 (2012). The phrase
originates in the holding in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (“We hold that,
construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be
chosen ‘by the People of the several States’ means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”).
64
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (“[W]e are willing to defer to state
59
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Courts apply the “one person, one vote” standard by means of a multistep
analysis:
(1) The court looks to the difference between the populations of
the largest and smallest districts in a state;65
(2) if the difference is 10% or less of the total population, the
district allocations are generally presumed constitutional;66
(3) if the court finds that the state did not make a good-faith effort
to create equal districts, it can hold that a state’s map is
unconstitutional despite a deviation less than 10%;67
(4) If the difference exceeds 10%, then the state must explain the
legitimate reason for the deviation.68
In these scenarios, vote dilution occurs when a state draws some districts
with fewer people in it than others; this results in inflated political power
for the smaller districts and diluted power for the larger ones.69
Because the “one person, one vote” framework presumes no dilution
if the total populations of each district are within 10% of each other,70 and
because the voting districts at issue in the prison-gerrymandering context
typically fall within the 10% threshold,71 malapportionment-based
challenges to prison-based gerrymandering will often fail to satisfy the
threshold requirements. In regard to prison-based gerrymandering, what
makes the voting districts unequal is the fact that large incarcerated
populations are misplaced in the population counts, which causes the
boundary lines to be drawn in the wrong places (and not affirmative action
by redistricting bodies).72
This scenario played out in Davidson v. Cranston, the only prisonbased gerrymandering case to make it to the circuit level on the merits. In
legislative policies, so long as they are consistent with constitutional norms, even if they
require small differences in the population of congressional districts.”).
65
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983).
66
Id. at 842.
67
Karcher, 462 U.S. at 744–45.
68
Brown, 462 U.S. at 843–44.
69
For example, representatives of the districts with fewer people will enjoy an equal
vote in the state legislator as a representative of a district with significantly more people.
This results in the members of the smaller district having their voices heard “louder” by
those drowned out in a larger district. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556–61 (1964)
(describing the nature of vote dilution cases).
70
Brown, 462 U.S. at 842.
71
Maps being challenged for prison-based gerrymandering have districts that, on their
face, are equipopulous. See e.g., infra note 73 and accompanying text.
72
See Short, supra note 45, at 902 (“When conducting the decennial census, the
Census Bureau counts prisoners as residents of the town in which their prisons are located.
State legislators then use the data compiled from the Census Bureau to draw legislative
districts, counting the prison population in the prison district—even though prisoners in the
majority of states cannot vote.”).
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holding that the City of Cranston was not in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, the First Circuit noted that the municipal districts’
populations were within the 10% safe harbor.73 The court also reasoned
that because the City was simply using the population numbers from the
Census, the maps were presumptively valid.74 The court dismissed the
plaintiff’s arguments regarding the unique form of vote dilution that
occurred because of prison-based gerrymandering75 and held instead that
the maps were constitutional.76 The First Circuit’s analysis is not
necessarily the correct application of the Equal Protection Clause in this
context,77 but it does highlight the potential rigidness and inflexibility of
that particular framework.
Even if the Supreme Court were willing to resolve the prison-based
gerrymandering issue under the Equal Protection framework, but without
reliance on the formalistic 10% rule, a colorblind remedy would be
inadequate.78 The solution of excluding prisoners from population counts
does not directly remedy the harm that the practice imposes on
communities of color. In Calvin v. Jefferson, the court held that the 10%
standard was inapplicable as a threshold matter in the context of prisonbased gerrymandering because the basis of that threshold, how the
populations were counted, was being challenged.79 This reasoning allowed
73

Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2016) (“The City’s
population in the 2010 Census was 80,387, and each of the City’s six wards includes
approximately 13,500 persons, with a ‘total maximum deviation among the population of
the six wards [of] less than ten percent.’”).
74
Id. at 145 (“The inclusion of the prisoners in the 2010 Census data for the City
affords a presumptively valid reason for including them in the City’s Redistricting Plan.
Nothing argued by the plaintiffs or found by the district court casts doubt on that
presumptive validity.”).
75
The court was unwilling to embrace what they called an “unusual” form of vote
dilution. Id. at 144 (“This conclusion becomes more obvious when one considers the
unusual nature of the plaintiffs’ vote-dilution claim.”).
76
Id. at 144–45. It is worth noting here that the plaintiffs did not advance a claim of
invidious discrimination specifically. Id. at 141. They brought the case solely based on the
alleged vote inflation and dilution. Id. This is yet another reason to take a race-conscious
approach to litigation because there would have been further discussion and potentially a
different outcome had the plaintiffs argued the effects of prison-based gerrymandering on
the voting power of Black and brown communities specifically.
77
See the discussion of Calvin v. Jefferson, infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
78
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence generally favors color-blind application of the
law. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 307–08 (2013) (“Any racial
classification must meet strict scrutiny, for when government decisions ‘touch upon an
individual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the
burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.’”). I assume courts would continue that Equal Protection trend in
remedying prison-based gerrymandering.
79
Calvin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1314 (N.D. Fla.
2016).
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the court to hold that the inclusion of prison populations in voting maps
was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because it diluted
the vote and representation of prison-less districts.80
Although the voting districts would appear equal after excluding
prison populations completely, minority voting districts would still be
missing thousands of people.81 States would still be drawing maps to
appear equipopulous, which would necessarily require the majorityminority districts to include more people who are not minorities. This
practice would still dilute the voting power of these communities in relation
to communities that are not disproportionally incarcerated. Furthermore,
there is a larger historical context to how communities of color are
counted,82 and any solution that simply eliminates large swaths of these
communities from population counts is offensive given that history. Since
the ratification of this country’s constitution, Black people were
undercounted by 40% because of the Three-Fifths Compromise.83 Even
after the three-fifths counting process was abandoned, Black people have
been undercounted at rates higher than white people.84
The exclusionary remedy also undermines our country’s foundational
right of representation. The Supreme Court, in Evenwel v. Abbot, held that
states could rely on total population for drawing electoral maps, in part
because accounting for non-voters allowed the allocation of representatives
80

Id. at 1315. In reaching this holding, the court focused on the fact that the
incarcerated population lacked a representational nexus with the districts that they were
being included in. Id. at 1316. The court was convinced that the harm of prison-based
gerrymandering was that the people in prison were not being properly represented by the
districts that enjoyed an inflation of voting power. See id. at 1317–20. This conclusion is
one that is generally correct but lacks the specificity of who is being harmed. I argue that
the harm is most significantly felt by communities of color.
81
See Wagner, supra note 7, at 1244–45 (discussing the impact of prison-based
gerrymandering in terms of the number of individuals that are displaced from communities
of color).
82
See Erika L. Wood, One Significant Step: How Reforms to Prison Districts Begin to
Address Political Inequality, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 179, 208 (2015) (“By reallocating
incarcerated residents back to their home districts, the laws in Maryland and New York
represent a significant step in returning political power to inner-city communities whose
voice has long been weakened and diluted by the intersection of the Census and mass
incarceration.”).
83
Robert B. Hill, Counting and Undercounting Diversity in the 21st Century, 32 U.
TOL. L. REV. 29, 30 (2000).
84
Shane T. Stansbury, Making Sense of the Census: The Decennial Census Debate and
Its Meaning for America’s Ethnic and Racial Minorities, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403,
409–10 (2000) (noting the persistent undercount of Black Americans as exceeding the
undercount of non-black people by 5.8%). See also Benjamin J. Razi, Comment, Census
Politics Revisited: What to Do When the Government Can’t Count?, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 1101,
1108 (1999) (“Although nearly all of America’s white population is counted every ten years,
our censuses consistently fail to count a significant percentage of the nation’s minority
population.”).
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to effectively manage the concerns and suggestions of all people.85 The
Court noted that “nonvoters have an important stake in many policy
debates,” and that counting them “promotes equitable and effective
representation.”86 Although people who are incarcerated are non-voters,
they should be able to have a stake in policy debates. Counting them in the
communities in which they truly belong would promote equitable and
effective representation.
If a court were willing to abandon the 10% threshold and remedy the
problem by redistributing the incarcerated population back to their home
districts, that would be sufficient to solve the problem, but it would still
avoid addressing the racial undertones of the issue.
B. Equal Protection Relief for Intentional Racial Classifications
Courts also interpret the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit states
from intentionally discriminating on the basis of race with respect to the
drawing of voting districts.87 These cases can raise constitutional concerns
even where the relevant districts survive the “one person, one vote”
analysis, as they center on the question of whether the legislature has drawn
maps in a way that dilutes the voting power of a particular group.88
Typically, states dilute the votes of a group by either “packing” or
“cracking” it on the voting map. Packing occurs when redistricting bodies
concentrate the members of the group in one voting district, so as to reduce
their influence in other districts.89 Cracking occurs when boundary lines
are drawn to break up the group among a number of districts (thus
preventing that group from holding the majority in any one district).90
When plaintiffs can prove, directly or through circumstantial evidence, that
the packing and cracking were done in an intentionally race-based manner,
courts review the maps under strict scrutiny.91
This approach provides a solution that accounts for racial
discrimination in theory but still does not account for structural forms of
vote dilution.92 Prison-based gerrymandering is more of a structural
85

Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016).
Id.
87
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1993).
88
Id.
89
See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1924 (2018).
90
Id.
91
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996).
92
This phenomenon is part of a larger conversation about the efficacy of the Equal
Protection Clause when it comes to structural disadvantage or discrimination. See Ian
Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1813 (2012) (“By making a
showing of intent a necessary prerequisite for establishing unconstitutionality, it sought to
close off equal protection as a means of challenging structural harms to non-Whites. . . . [I]t
86
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problem than traditional packing or cracking of minority or other kinds of
groups and thus lacks the requisite intent.93 Because litigants must prove
intent, which is difficult even in the traditional racial gerrymandering
context, prison-based gerrymandering claims will be nearly impossible
within this framework.94
III. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AS A WORKABLE RACE-CONSCIOUS
SOLUTION
To date, no one has litigated a prison-based gerrymandering case
using Section 2 of the VRA. That fact makes it impossible to know for
certain what the benefits and drawbacks of this approach would be.
However, the Supreme Court has a robust history of applying Section 2 of
the VRA, and there exists a wide range of legal scholarship that might be
leveraged on behalf of such an approach. This section explores the
possibility of using the VRA for prison-based gerrymandering claims. The
novelty of this issue also presents an opportunity to reassess the Court’s
current framework for VRA analysis for applicability in the context of
systemic rather than specific discrimination.
A. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
The VRA requires states and political subdivisions to provide equal
opportunity to racial minority communities to elect a representative of their
choice.95 Section 2 of the VRA specifically prohibits any standard,
practice, or procedure related to voting that discriminates on the basis of
race.96 Congress amended Section 2 in 1982 to lessen the burden on the
plaintiff.97 Before the 1982 amendments clarified Congress’s intent, courts
required plaintiffs to show that voting maps were intentionally
discriminatory.98 Section 2 of the VRA now provides relief to communities
did renounce a constitutional commitment to ensuring equitable outcomes.”).
93
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995) (“Shape is relevant . . . because it
may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other
districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its
district lines.”).
94
See, e.g., id.
95
E.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2315 (2018).
96
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018).
97
Section
2
of
the
Voting
Rights
Act,
U.S.
DEPT.
JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-2-voting-rights-act (last visited Sept. 13, 2018). See
also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a
certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to
cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their
preferred representatives.”).
98
See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980) (holding that “the language
of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the sparse
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of color on a showing of disparate impact instead.99 When Congress
amended the VRA in 1982, it specifically repudiated the intent-based
framework that courts had been using to effectuate Section 2’s
protections.100 Following Congress’s lead, courts now utilize a framework
that does not require litigants to show a discriminatory purpose and instead
allows evidence of the disparate impact.101 Given the systemic nature of
discrimination, which often occurs without an overt intention, this approach
is especially important.102
In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court interpreted the newest
version of Section 2 for the first time.103 The Court relied on both the
legislative history and the accompanying regulations of the VRA to create a
general test for liability under Section 2.104 Under this test, the plaintiff
bears the burden of making out a prima facie case of vote dilution, which
can be shown by demonstrating that: (1) the minority group in question is
“sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district,”105 (2) the group is “politically cohesive,”106 and (3)
the white voters vote “as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the
minority’s preferred candidate.”107 If a plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case, the plaintiff must then go on to establish minority vote dilution by a
totality of the circumstances.108 The totality of the circumstances test is
broad, but employs nine factors found in the regulations of the VRA to

legislative history of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from
that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.”). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
99
See, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43 (“Subsection 2(a) prohibits all States and political
subdivisions from imposing any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or any
standards, practices, or procedures which result in the denial or abridgment of the right to
vote of any citizen who is a member of a protected class of racial and language minorities.”)
(emphasis in original).
100
Id. at 44 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28 (1982) (“[The intent test] is
‘unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part of individual
officials or entire communities,’ it places an ‘inordinately difficult’ burden of proof on
plaintiffs, and it ‘asks the wrong question.’”).
101
See id. (“The ‘right’ question, as the Report emphasizes repeatedly, is whether ‘as a
result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to
participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.’”); Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 394 (1991) (“Under the amended statute, proof of intent is no longer
required to prove a § 2 violation. Now plaintiffs can prevail under § 2 by demonstrating that
a challenged election practice has resulted in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote
based on color or race.”).
102
See supra note 3.
103
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34.
104
Id. at 36–37.
105
Id. at 50.
106
Id. at 51.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 36.

LAING (DO NOT DELETE)

514

11/27/2019 12:01 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:499

focus the analysis.109 Thus, under Gingles, a Section 2 claim of vote
dilution can succeed only upon the satisfaction of the so-called Gingles
factors, accompanied by a “totality-of-the-circumstances” demonstration of
vote dilution.
The Section 2 framework differs from the “one person, one vote”
framework in that it does not rely as heavily on broad quantitative metrics.
The only broad numerical requirement of the Gingles factors is the
requirement that the voting age minorities constitute a sufficiently large
majority within a district to elect a candidate of their choice. The other
factors consider the specific racial polarization of the relevant majority and
minority voting blocks.110 The “totality of the circumstances” prong of the
test, meanwhile, allows courts to consider how historic and present policies
and conditions interact to create instances of minority vote dilution despite
the lack of state intent or action.111 But perhaps most importantly, the VRA
provides a clear opportunity to remedy the harm that communities of color
suffer because of prison-based gerrymandering by reallocating the
incarcerated population to pre-incarceration voting districts. A vindicated
Section 2 challenge to prison-based gerrymandering would require the
relief to be specific to people of color, the people who brought the suit,
instead of papering over the surface-level problems by excluding prison
populations from voting districts altogether. For the reasons discussed in
the section above, the solution to prison-based gerrymandering must be the
reallocation of prison populations to their home voting districts.112
Although the Supreme Court has recently limited the scope of the
VRA,113 the Court has also asserted support for Section 2 as an important
nationwide protector of minority voting rights.114
Prison-based
gerrymandering and other complex issues of systemic minority vote
dilution can and should be litigated using the malleable framework
109

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–37 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982)).
Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1851 (1992) (“Gingles brought the
racially polarized voting inquiry into the undisputed and unchallenged center of the Voting
Rights Act.”).
111
Franita Tolson, What Is Abridgement?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L.
REV. 433, 449–50 (2015) (discussing the role of the totality of the circumstances analysis
and the lack on a requirement for discriminatory intent).
112
See Wood, supra note 82.
113
See e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 14–15 (2009) (limiting Section 2 of the
VRA to addressing dilution of only one minority group at a time); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S.
874, 881–82 (1994) (choosing not to apply Section 2 of the VRA to a county’s choice to
have a single county commissioner form of government).
114
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537 (2013) (“Section 2 is permanent, applies
nationwide, and is not at issue in this case.”). The court later stated, “Our decision in no
way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in §2.”
Id. at 557.
110
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provided by Section 2 of the VRA.
B. Hayden v. Pataki Suggests the Potential of the VRA to Operate as
a Remedy for Prison-Based Gerrymandering
Although courts have not undertaken a VRA prison-based
gerrymandering claim, the Second Circuit has alluded to the possibility of
such a claim in Hayden v. Pataki.115 In that case, the plaintiffs, who were a
mix of incarcerated and free people, only alluded to a prison-based
gerrymandering claim.116
As such, the Second Circuit made a
determination only on the claim that the state’s felon disenfranchisement
laws violated the VRA.117
The Court held that the challenged
disenfranchisement was not unlawful because it was not the intention of
Congress to address disenfranchisement policies under the VRA.118
This case is relevant not because of any precedential value, but
because it suggests that claims challenging practices that are more
obviously related to election processes are easier for courts to fit within the
framework of the VRA. Arguably, a properly raised prison-based
gerrymandering claim should be more readily accepted by courts as within
the scope of the VRA because it deals directly with the redistricting
process. Unlike disenfranchisement policies overall, which arguably deal
with criminal sanctions, the apportionment process falls squarely within the
scope of state activity that the VRA was enacted to regulate.119
C. Surpassing the Gingles Factors
As a threshold manner, any voting rights claim must surpass the
Gingles factors.120 But prison-based gerrymandering may present a novel
enough concept to require a slightly adjusted application of these factors.
The Supreme Court has noted the flexibility of the factors in stating that,
115

Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 329 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 328–29 (“It is unclear whether plaintiffs’ vote dilution claim also encompasses
a claim on behalf of plaintiffs who are neither incarcerated nor on parole, that their votes are
‘diluted’ because of New York’s apportionment process, see N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4, which
counts incarcerated prisoners as residents of the communities in which they are incarcerated,
and has the alleged effect of increasing upstate New York regions’ populations at the
expense of New York City’s.”).
117
Id. at 329.
118
Id.
119
Voter disenfranchisement laws directly affect the relative weight of voters from
majority-minority communities. But those policies typically exist in state constitutions
among criminal sanctions, which is sufficiently outside of the administration or regulation
of elections. The process of redistricting, in contrast, exists almost solely to create fair
elections. This should make prison-based gerrymandering arguments more palatable to
courts than the voter disenfranchisement arguments have been. See supra Part IV-b.
120
See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006–07 (1994).
116
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“[o]f course, the Gingles factors cannot be applied mechanically and
without regard to the nature of the claim.”121 Litigants can thus proceed in
at least two ways to overcome this threshold issue: (1) characterizing of
prison-based gerrymandering as a modern form of cracking, or (2)
adjusting the third Gingles factor to better address a prison-based
gerrymandering claim. Under either theory, prison-less majority-minority
districts supply the basis for this analysis because those are the
communities that are being harmed.122
1. Prison-Based Gerrymandering as a Modern-Day Form of
Impermissible Cracking
Litigants who present this issue in terms of cracking will argue that
counting people where they are imprisoned deprives that state of majorityminority districts. In essence, a district might constitute a majorityminority district but for the fact that a segment of the population is counted
elsewhere. Such a claim could fit into the traditional application of the
Gingles factors if the number of incarcerated people from a community of
color is large enough.
The first factor requires that the plaintiffs prove that the relevant
minority group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district.”123 Typically, courts
make this determination by looking to the demographics of the relevant
population, usually a proposed district, to see if the minority group is
sufficiently large.124 Courts disagree as to whether the basis of that inquiry
should be based on total population or voting-age population.125
Nevertheless, a minority group that is over 50% of the voting-age
population of a community typically satisfies this part of the inquiry.126
Even after losing a significant number of voting-aged people to
incarceration elsewhere, many communities of color around the country
qualify as majority-minority districts.127 Because similar communities of
color tend to be the communities affected by prison-based
121

Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993).
It is true that prison-based gerrymandering harms other prison-less districts
regardless of the racial makeup, but the nature of those harms is not the subject of this
comment. The proposed solution would also remedy harm to those districts.
123
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
124
See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 12 (2009).
125
Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 661 (2006).
126
See, e.g., Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19–20 (“[A] party asserting § 2 liability must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election district
is greater than 50 percent.”).
127
See Majority-Minority Districts, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Majority-mino
rity_districts (last visited Apr. 18, 2019).
122
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gerrymandering,128 many of these communities will satisfy this first
requirement.
Next, courts require plaintiffs to prove that the relevant minority
group is “politically cohesive”129 and that the white voters’ votes will act
“as a bloc to . . . defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”130 The purpose
of the second and third factors is to show that racially polarized voting
warrants ensuring that the minorities could elect a representative of their
choice.131 Traditionally, addressing these factors involves showing that the
state’s apportionment plan either cracked the minority group into more than
one district, creating white majority blocs across multiple districts, or
packed the minority group into as few districts as possible, thus ensuring a
high number of majority-white districts elsewhere in the state.132
Despite the narrative that voting is no longer racially polarized,133 the
voting habits of communities of color are still noticeably different than
rural white communities.134 Communities affected by prison-based
gerrymandering are likely to be able to satisfy part of the inquiry into
racially polarized voting by showing the different voting habits and values
in their communities compared to the prison-communities.135 Additionally,
the plaintiffs would reiterate that if not for counting so many Black people
outside of the district, there would be a majority-minority district whose
minority voting population would be large enough to secure election of its
preferred candidate.
Although this approach seems simple, it depends on the willingness of
courts to consider the manner of accounting for people in population counts
as analogous to traditional cracking. Courts should consider this approach
because it does not require much deviation from previous applications of
the Gingles factors.

128

See supra Parts I, II-b.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 55–56 (discussing the Senate Report’s focus on racially polarized voting).
132
See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993).
133
See, e.g., Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining
Racially Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, 2219 (2003) (“[M]ost studies do
indicate that there are areas of the country in which racially polarized voting, at least by
whites, has declined to the point that minority candidates are able to win elections in
districts that have significant minority populations but are still majority-white.”).
134
See John M. Powers, Statistical Evidence of Racially Polarized Voting in the Obama
Elections, and Implications for Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 102 GEO. L.J. 881, 891
(2014) (“[R]acially polarized voting is not an aberration but a longstanding, pervasive, and
continuing feature of numerous jurisdictions’ electoral histories—both at statewide and local
levels . . . .”).
135
See, e.g., Short, supra note 45, at 938.
129
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2. Adjusting the Third Factor
In the alternative, litigants can ask courts to adjust the application of
the Gingles factors to best fit the problem. The litigants can frame the
prison-based gerrymandering claim differently by focusing on the
relationship between the prison district and the home majority-minority
district. The first and second Gingles factors would remain the same, but
the difference would be in how the majority bloc injures the minority’s
ability to elect a representative of their choice. Here, the majority bloc
exists as the prison district whose vote is inflated at the expense of the
minority district. In other words, minority voters’ votes would “weigh
less” than the votes of the voters in the prison district in the sense of
operating to secure the election of a candidate who represents a larger share
of the state’s overall electorate.136 Practically speaking, this inequity
requires more minority votes than it should in a prison-less district to
overcome the will of the majority.137 This injury is just as real to the
minority community as the traditional inequality that courts have remedied
through Section 2 of the VRA.
Given the novelty of prison-based gerrymandering claims, courts
should make a minor adjustment to how they apply the third Gingles factor.
Such an adjustment would simply consider the inflated vote of the prison
district, in combination with a showing of racially polarized voting, as
representing a form by which a white voting bloc can “defeat” the
preferences of a minority voting bloc. Courts should not fear that such an
adjustment would impermissibly expand the scope of the VRA because
plaintiffs would still have to show that, by a totality of the circumstances,
the minority voters are not able to participate equally in an election.
D. Leaning Into the Totality of the Circumstances Test
In order to establish liability under section 2 of the VRA, plaintiffs
must prove that based on a totality of the circumstances, the political
process is “not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”138 Although
this is a broad and fact-intensive test, courts have employed nine factors in
their analysis which are listed below:

136
137
138

See supra Part II-c.
See supra Part II-c.
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018).
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(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state
or political subdivision that touched the right of the members
of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to
participate in the democratic process;139
(2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized;140
(3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements,
anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or
procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;141
(4) if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to that process;142
(5) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state
or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in
such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder
their ability to participate effectively in the political
process;143
(6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt
or subtle racial appeals;144
(7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction;145
(8) whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group;146 and
(9) whether the policy underlying the state or political
subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, a prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.147
Courts do not require a particular number of these factors to be
considered.148 Courts also do not limit the inquiry to these nine factors.149
In the end, the goal of this inquiry is to determine whether the political

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36–37 (1986).
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 45.
Id.
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process is truly open to every voter equally based on “a searching practical
evaluation” of both “past and present reality.”150 In a prison-based
gerrymandering case, courts should consider the factors that focus on a
history of discrimination, the current effects of discrimination, racial
appeals in elections, and elected officials’ lack of responsiveness to
minority voters. The court would have considered the second factor,
racially polarized voting, in the threshold consideration of the Gingles
factors.
For the first factor, litigants can show the specific history of official
discrimination and minority voter suppression in the relevant state or
subdivision. For instance, litigants could trace back to Jim Crow-era voting
requirements and include any official acts that negatively affected the
minority’s access to the democratic process.151 For example, courts have
considered as part of this analysis: resistance to integrating public
schools152 and lack of support for minority candidates by major parties.153
Plaintiffs should introduce such historical evidence as part of their prisonbased gerrymandering claims because it not only provides context for how
the state or subdivision could allow discriminatory practices today, but also
shows another contributor to the alleged vote dilution.154
As to the fifth factor, courts inquiring into the effects of
discrimination have considered: (1) a history of discrimination and current
depressed socioeconomic status of the minority group, (2) the nexus
between the alleged discrimination and participation in the political
process, or (3) whether there is causation between the discrimination and
participation.155 Regardless of the specific approach that a court may take,
litigants could provide evidence that past and present discrimination
hinders the relevant minority group from fully participating in the political
process. Within the context of prison-based gerrymandering, evidence of
disparities in the prison-less district arising from criminal policies
established by the legislature elected in a prison-based gerrymandering
system, or the enforcement of those policies, may be especially relevant. In
addition, litigants could provide evidence about discrimination arising from
150

Id.
Katz, supra note 125, at 676.
152
United States v. Marengo Cty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1567–68 (11th Cir. 1984).
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Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695, 731 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
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See, e.g., Marengo Cty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d at 1567 (“[P]ast discrimination can
severely impair the present-day ability of minorities to participate on an equal footing in the
political process. Past discrimination may cause blacks to register or vote in lower numbers
than whites. Past discrimination may also lead to present socioeconomic disadvantages,
which in turn can reduce participation and influence in political affairs.” (citing Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1306 (5th Cir. 1973))).
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Katz, supra note 125, at 703–07.
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housing policies that result in both housing and school segregation. Most
essentially, litigants should argue that as a result of segregation and mass
incarceration in the state or subdivision, the minority group is less able to
participate in the political process. This point can be made by pointing to,
for example, the resulting socio-economic status of families both broken up
by criminal justice policy and deprived of opportunity by an underserved
school system.156 There are a number of other ways that these issues of
socio-economic status could affect the ability of voters to participate,
including lack of transportation to the polls,157 and even lack of ability to
take time off from work to vote.158
For the sixth factor, litigants can provide any evidence of overt or
subtle racial appeals in political campaigns of those empowered by the
prison-based gerrymandering system. For example, courts have considered
candidates being on opposite sides of racially-charged political issues.159
This kind of inquiry will require litigants to show a court how racially
neutral comments about being “tough on crime,” for example, are actually
racialized.160 They can show that this is especially true when a rural
representative has a prison in their district filled with people from majorityminority communities. When that representative makes those statements,
he or she is not only supporting a policy that will keep the prison industry
in the district strong, but a policy that thrives off discriminating against
Black and brown people. Such political positions are not only racially
charged in theory but in practice as well.
As to the eighth factor, litigants can show the lack of responsiveness
in the prison district to the concerns of the minorities wrongly counted
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See Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 HOW. L.J. 343,
348 (2011) (“Today, these two systems—the education and justice systems—have
developed a ‘symbiotic relationship,’ effectively working together to lock out large numbers
of youth of color from societal opportunity and advantage.”).
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Daniel Weeks, Why Are the Poor and Minorities Less Likely to Vote?, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-are-the-poorand-minorities-less-likely-to-vote/282896/ (“Black and Hispanic citizens, for whom the
poverty rate is close to three times that of whites, were three times as likely as whites to not
have the requisite I.D. and to have difficulty finding the correct polling place. . . . They were
also substantially more likely than whites to report transportation problems and bad time
and location as reasons for not getting to the polls, while white voters were the most likely
to cite disapproval of candidate choices.”).
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Christopher Ingraham, A Ton of People Didn’t Vote Because They Couldn’t Get
Time Off from Work, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/11/12/a-ton-of-people-didnt-vote-because-they-couldnt-get-time-off-fromwork/?utm_term=.4f10f627e22f.
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Katz, supra note 125, at 709.
160
See Julia Azari, From Wallace to Trump, the Evolution of “Law and Order”,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 13, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/from-wallace-totrump-the-evolution-of-law-and-order/.
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there. To be clear, this particular argument is not directly about the harm to
the voters currently counted in the majority-minority community. But
because even those who do not have the right to vote are guaranteed
representation, this kind of injury is relevant to a prison-based
gerrymandering claim in that it shows that people would be better
represented in their home communities. Because people who are
incarcerated do not have the right to vote, it is unsurprising that they belong
to a constituency that is not catered to during political campaigns. But is
not the entire purpose of including this population in the apportionment
context in the first place to not deprive the population of the opportunity to
be represented? The fact that representatives enjoy power because of
having a prison in their district, but do not care to represent the concerns of
that population,161 can and should be circumstantial evidence of a lack of
responsiveness to the concerns of the disproportionately Black and brown
prisoners. Given that these unrepresented individuals could be included in
a district in a way that would better empower that district to represent the
collective concerns of minorities, their inclusion in the prison district is
even more questionable.
In considering each of these factors individually and collectively,
courts should be able to see that under a totality of the circumstances,
prison-based gerrymandering, in combination with other historic and
present forms of systemic discrimination, hinders minorities from equally
accessing the political process.
V. CONCLUSION
Issues of vote dilution can seem philosophical or insubstantial to the
average person. But what is at stake when states choose to count the prison
population where they are incarcerated, and not in the communities that
they know as home, is the battered right to vote of people of color in this
country. Litigants have an opportunity to bring a claim in a manner that
directly addresses the fact that the current apportionment process in most
states dilutes the vote within communities of color. Courts have an

161
See Letter from Justin Levitt, Professor, Loyola Law School, to Karen Humes, Chief,
Population
Division,
U.S.
Census
Bureau,
at
4
(July
20,
2015),
http://redistricting.lls.edu/other/2015%20census%20residence%20comment.pdf (“[A] New
York state legislator representing a district housing thousands of incarcerated individuals
said that given a choice between the district’s cows and the district’s prisoners, he would
‘take his chances’ with the cows, because ‘[t]hey would be more likely to vote for me.’”);
Sam Roberts, Census Bureau’s Counting of Prisoners Benefits Some Rural Voting Districts,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/us/politics/24census.html
(“‘Do I consider them my constituents?’ Mr. Young said of the inmates who constitute an
overwhelming majority of the ward’s population. ‘They don’t vote, so, I guess, not
really.’”).
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opportunity to address a form of discrimination that, though lacking in hard
evidence of discriminatory intent, systemically harms the most vulnerable
communities in the nation.
It would be overstating things to suggest that the proposed solution in
Section 2 of the VRA is the only way to solve this problem. But this
solution at least allows both state governments and advocates to put their
cards on the table, and allows courts, for the first time, to make a statement
about whether this kind of discrimination is fixable by using civil rights
legislation instead of—or in addition to—the Equal Protection Clause.
People of color in this country deserve to have their issues addressed
directly and not swept under the rug in the name of aspirational
colorblindness.
If such a claim is heard by the Supreme Court, and the resulting
holding is one that continues the recent trend of limiting the scope of VRA
claims, advocates can take that unfortunate holding and instead lobby more
states to change their legislation on this issue. Like many racial justice
issues that have had their day in court, whatever the holding, advocates can
use it to motivate change in the consciousness of the average American.
Perhaps that is the sort of change that will motivate the Census Bureau to
wipe this problem away completely by adjusting their antiquated “Usual
Residence Rule.”

